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GOVERNMENT DRUG TESTING IN MARYLAND: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. UNITED 
FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS, LOCAL 400 
Ellen Zelinski Cohillt 
Drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions in American so-
ciety, I affecting the workplace in several ways. First, employees who 
are drug abusers jeopardize the safety of their co-workers and the 
general public; those using drugs have three to four times as many 
accidents as other employees. 2 Second, employees who use drugs have 
a "higher rate of absenteeism, with estimates ranging from 2.5 to 
t B.S., magna cum laude, 1981, Towson State University; M.A.S., 1986, Johns 
Hopkins University; J.D., 1992, University of Baltimore School of Law; 
Attorney, Maryland Department of Human Resources, Child Care Adminis-
tration, Baltimore, Maryland. 
1. Michael R. O'Donnell, Comment, Employee Drug Testing-Balancing the 
Interests in the Workplace: A Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 74 VA. L. REV. 
969, 970 (1988) (citing Evan Thomas, America's Crusade: What is Behind the 
Latest War on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 ("opinion polls reveal that 
drug abuse is now the nation's number one concern"»; see also Kaye M. 
Sunderland & Coni S. Rathbone, Development in the Law, Jar Wars: Drug 
Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 529-35 (1987) (providing 
a brief sketch of the magnitude of drug abuse and its societal costs). 
"More than seventy million Americans have experimented with illegal 
drugs, and twenty-three million currently use an illegal drug." James M. 
Sokolowski, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1990) (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL 
SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 95 (1989». 
2. Craig Zwerling et ai., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for 
Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639, 
2643 (1990). Research indicates that 
Id. 
[d) rug users have been reported to be involved in 200070 to 300070 
more industrial accidents, to sustain 400% more compensable injuries, 
and to use 1,500% more sick leave . . . . [T]hose with marijuana-
positive urine samples have 55 percent more industrial accidents, 85 
percent more injuries, and a 78 percent increase in absenteeism. 
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16 times higher than employees who do not use drugs."3 Third, drug 
abusers are likely to cause insurance costs to escalate because of 
increased accident claims. Finally, because of the illegal use of drugs 
in the workplace, billions of dollars are lost in productivity and 
absenteeism each year in the United States.4 
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 
Local 400,5 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the con-
stitutionality of the City of Annapolis' drug testing program of fire 
fighters and police personnel during routine physical examinations.6 
Although some degree of individualized suspicion is normally required 
for searches conducted in the absence of the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant and probable cause requirements, the court of appeals held 
that exceptions do exist. 7 Earlier the same year, the Supreme Court 
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab8 and Skinner 
v.- Railway Labor Executives' Association9 recognized that exceptions 
to the individualized suspicion requirement exist. - In United Food, 
the court of appeals recognized standards no more protective of 
employee rights than had been established by the Supreme Court. 1O 
This Article examines the current state of government drug 
testing in Maryland. Part I explores the problem of drugs in the 
government workplace and discusses the relevant federal law on 
government drug testing programs. Part II analyzes the United Food 
decision as it applies to mandatory government drug testing and its 
ramifications on the reasonable suspicion requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment in light of Von Raab and Skinner. Part III reviews the 
current state of Maryland law regarding drug testing. Part IV details 
the drug testing procedures implemented by the Secretary of Person-
3. Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Em-
ployment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 688 
(1987). 
4. Sokolowski, supra note I, at 1344 n.6 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL 
SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 95, 96 (1989»; see Anne 
M. Rector, Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: 
A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 
lOll, lOll (1986); see also Study: $50 Billion Wasted Annually from Abuse 
of Drugs and Alcohol, 4 Employee ReI. Weekly (BNA) 1554 (1986) (citing a 
study by the Comprehensive Care Corporation). 
5. 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989). 
6. [d. at 545-46, 565 A.2d at 672-73. 
7. [d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676. 
8. 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989). 
9. 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989). 
10. United Food, 317 Md. at 563, 565 A.2d at 681. While the Supreme Court is 
the final arbiter regarding protections embodied in the federal constitution, 
states are free to interpret their own constitutions as being more, but not less, 
protective of individual liberties than the Federal Constitution. 
1992) Government Drug Testing in Maryland 3 
nel and currently codified at COMAR 06.01.09. Part V examines the 
impact of various judicial and executive branch decisions on Mary-
land law. Finally, the Article concludes that the reasonableness 
balancing test established by the Supreme Court and adopted by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has given government employers wide 
latitude in implementing drug testing programs. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In response to the enormous drug abuse problem in the United 
States,1l in 1986, President Reagan issued an executive order man-
dating a "drug-free federal workplace."12 This wide-sweeping order 
dictated that illegal drug use by federal employees, on-duty or off-
duty, is unacceptable, and directed executive agencies to implement 
a program for random drug testing of employees in "sensitive po-
sitions."13 Other government employers concerned with the economic 
reality of drug abuse and safety in the workplace also responded by 
implementing employee drug testing programs. 14 State and local gov-
ernment workers from groups as diverse as fire fighters and police 
11. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
12. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 
(1988); see also Edward S. Adams, Random Drug Testing of Government 
Employees: A Constitutional Procedure, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1335, 1335 n.3 
(1987) (listing early military and administrative agency drug testing policies); 
Thomas L. McGovern, III, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the 
Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1453, 1460 (1987) (recog-
nizing that the first challenges to urinalysis testing concerned the Army's Drug 
and Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control Program). 
13. Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 12, § 3(a) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 
(1988). Section 7(d) of the Order defines an "employee in a sensitive position" 
as any of the following: 
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special 
Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, or Non-Critical-Sensitive ... ; 
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information 
or may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a 
determination of trustworthiness by an agency head . . . ; 
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments; 
(4) Law enforcement officers ... ; and 
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law en-
forcement, national security, the protection of life and property, public 
health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust 
and confidence. 
[d. § 7(d)(1)-(5) (emphasis added). 
14. Martha I. Finney, The Right To Be Tested, 33 PERSONNEL ADM. 74, 74 (1988) 
(" About a third of U.S. businesses and government agencies have implemented 
drug testing in the workplace, including nine out of 10 utilities, eight out of 
10 transportation operations and half of sports associations and government 
agencies. "). 
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officers,15 correction officers,16 probationary school teachers,17 nuclear 
power plant employees,18 racing commission licensees,19 and city 
transit authority conductors20 have been subjected to drug testing. 21 
As a result of these testing programs, many government em-
ployees are questioning the constitutionality of drug testing. Unlike 
private sector programs,22 government drug testing programs consti-
tute state action, enabling opponents to invoke the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23 The Fourth 
15. See McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 799 P.2d 953 (Haw. 1990) (upholding 
drug testing of a police officer); Doe v. City of Honolulu, 816 P.2d 306 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the fire department's suspicion less drug testing of 
urine specimens collected at the time of the fire fighters' annual physical 
examination); O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 
1990) (holding that unannounced, warrantless, suspicionless urinalysis testing 
of profiled police cadets was constitutional). 
16. See Seelig v. Koehler, 556 N.E.2d 125 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 
(1990) (upholding mandatory, random drug testing of all correction officers). 
17. See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 505 N.Y.S.2d 
888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (testing probationary teachers without individualized 
suspicion held unconstitutional), a/I'd, 510 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1987). 
18. See Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427 (Wash. 
1988) (upholding mandatory urinalysis drug testing for all prospective employees 
at a municipally-owned nuclear power plant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 
(1989). 
19. Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 580 So. 2d 469 (La. Ct. App.) 
(upholding drug testing of all licensees of commission, except owners who are 
not trainers), cert. denied, 584 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1991). 
20. Dozier v. New York City, 519 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (upholding 
New York City Transit Authority drug testing of three applicants for the 
position of conductor). 
21. Urinalysis is the most popular method of drug testing for several reasons: 
(I) The collection of urine is noninvasive; (2) large volumes can be 
collected easily; (3) drugs and metabolites are generally present in 
higher concentrations in urine than in other tissues or fluids ... ; (4) 
urine is easier to analyze than blood and other tissues ... ; and (5) 
drugs and their metabolites are usually very stable in frozen urine, 
allowing long-term storage of positive samples. 
Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Scientific Issues 
in Drug Testing, 257 JAMA 3110, 3111 (1987). Although blood tests are more 
invasive than urinalysis tests, they can be tailored to detect recent drug use. 
Tia S. Denenberg & Richard V. Denenberg, Employee Drug Testing and the 
Arbitrator: What Are the Issues? 42 ARB. J. 19,27 (1987); Kurt M. Dubowski, 
Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, II NOVA L. REv. 415, 427-28, 432· 
35 (1987). 
22. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private employers in the absence 
of "state action." See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). The 
Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
23. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
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Amendment prohibits the federal government and its agents from 
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures.24 State constitutional 
provisions, such as Maryland's Declaration of Rights, also forbid 
unreasonable government searches and seizures.2s The ultimate deter-
mination of a search's "reasonableness," however, requires the bal-
ancing of the intrusiveness of the search against its promotion of a 
legitimate government interest. 26 
In the past, federal and state courts have consistently struck 
down government drug testing programs as unreasonable searches 
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 27 In Capua v. 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV .. 
24. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,335 (1985). A search conducted 
by governmental actors assumes constitutional significance, however, only when 
it is also unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
25. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: 
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected 
places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous [sic] and 
oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to 
apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, 
or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted. 
MD. CONST. CODE ANN. art. 26 (1981). 
Although this Article focuses on public-sector employees, seven state 
constitutions contain a protection for the right of privacy which may presumably 
be violated by the mandatory drug testing of private-sector employees. See 
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; 
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
26. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (stating that reasonableness is deter-
mined in light of "all of the circumstances surrounding the search . . . and 
the nature of the search ... itself"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 
(1969) (stating that reasonableness is determined by the facts and circumstances 
of each case "in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles"); 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (stating that reasonableness of a 
search and seizure is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case). 
27. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990) 
(holding drug testing of all job applicants unconstitutional); Beattie v. City of 
St. Petersburg Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding 
suspicionless drug testing of firefighters unconstitutional since the city could 
not demonstrate any evidence of drug use, on- or off-duty, or a history of 
accidents attributable to drug use); American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 
725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989) (ruling drug testing of job applicants without 
individualized suspicion unconstitutional); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees 
v. Thornburgh, 720 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding mandatory, random 
urinalysis testing of all Federal Bureau of Prisons employees unconstitutional). 
See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, Behind Open Doors: Constitutional Impli-
cations of Government Employee Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 307, 337 
(1987) (stating that a majority of lower courts have held drug testing procedures 
unconstitutional). 
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City of Plainfield,28 a federal district court was confronted with the 
issue of whether a substance abuse testing program implemented by 
a New Jersey city's police and fire departments was constitutional. 
Under the program, all members of the police and fire departments 
were subject to surprise urinalysis testing.29 The city based imple-
mentation of the program upon the belief that its duty to protect 
the public welfare mandated the employment of drug-free police 
officers and fire fighters. 3o The Capua court, however, held that the 
program constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 31 The court reasoned that the program 
not only "[swept] up the innocent with the guilty" employees but 
also "sacrifice[d] each [employee's] Fourth Amendment rights in the 
name of some larger public interest. "32 
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,33 municipal fire fighters 
were required to submit to blood and urinalysis tests and "pat 
downs" at the discretion of the city fire and police commissioners. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the regulation authorizing a department-
wide drug test violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable 
search and seizure.34 The Lovvorn court found no evidence of a 
widespread drug problem or an individualized suspicion which would 
have justified the program.3S 
More recently, however, federal courts have upheld certain drug 
testing procedures by finding exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant and probable cause requirements. 36 In Amalgamated Transit 
28. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). 
29. [d. at 1511-12. The program implemented called for testing en masse, rather 
than individual testing. See id. 
30. [d. at 1515. 
31. [d. at 1517. 
32. [d. 
33. 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988). 
34. [d. at 1547. 
35. [d. 
36. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503, 
509 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the Navy's 
random drug testing of civilian employees holding security clearances with 
access to classified information); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department 
of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding constitutionality 
of drug testing of commercial drivers subject to Federal Highway Administra-
tion (FHWA) regulations); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1194 (D.C. 
Cir.) (holding urine tests of applicants for positions as attorneys at the 
Department of Justice did not constitute "unreasonable searches" under the 
Fourth Amendment), cert. denied sub nom., Willner v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 669 
(1991); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding random 
urinalysis testing of employees with "secret" security clearances was constitu-
tional), cerl. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2890 (1991); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 
484, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing random drug testing of Justice Department 
1992] Government Drug Testing in Maryland 7 
Union v. Cambria County Transit Authority,37 the court permitted 
drug testing as part of the employee's regularly scheduled physical 
examination, even absent evidence of drug abuse among transit 
emplo'yees. 38 The Amalgamated Transit Union court reasoned that 
"the Authority need not await the development of a problem[;] it 
may take preventative measures."39 Similarly, in Wrightsell v. City 
of Chicago,40 the court held that mandatory drug testing of police 
officers returning from leave of thirty days or more, conducted 
during a routine medical examination, was not an unreasonable search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.41 In Wrightsell, the 
court reasoned that requiring a urine sample as part of a physical 
examination is a minimal intrusion.42 The diversity of opinion in the 
federal courts drew the attention of the Supreme Court. . 
On March 21, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down two 
decisions upholding the constitutionality of certain government-or-
dered drug testing programs.43 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
personnel holding top secret national security clearances), cert. denied sub 
nom., Bell v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Holloman v. Greater Cleve-
land Regional Transit Auth., 741 F. Supp. 677, 686 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (up-
holding constitionality of drug testing of transit bus drivers), a/i'd, 930 F.2d 
918 (6th Cir. 1991). But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 
787 F. Supp. 255 (D. D.C. 1992) (granting "permanent injunction against the 
testing of motor vehicle operators whose duties do not include the transportation 
of passengers" or highly classified materials). 
The Supreme Court has recognized that requiring the government to 
procure a warrant for every work-related intrusion "would conflict with 'the 
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter." , O'Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 143 (1983». A search ordinarily must be based upon probable cause, 
even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in certain 
circumstances. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
37. 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
38. [d. at 907-08. 
39. [d. at 905. 
40. 678 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
41. [d. at 733-34; see also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(stating that mandatory drug testing of bus drivers, mechanics and attendants 
conducted "during routine, reasonably required annual medical examinations" 
minimized intrusion on privacy), vacated sub nom., Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 
1001, modified on remand, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 993 v. City of Oklahoma City, 710 F. Supp. 1321, 1331-
32 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (conducting mandatory drug testing of municipal transit 
employees operationally' involved in the transportation service during the course 
of regularly conducted medical examinations minimized intrusiveness). 
42. Wrightsell, 678 F. Supp. at 733. 
43. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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tives' Ass'n,44 the Court, by a 7-2 vote, upheld Federal Railroad 
Administration regulations that mandated testing of blood and urine 
samples for drug use by employees following major train accidents 
or the violation of safety standards.45 The Skinner Court held that, 
because the compelling government interest served by the regulations 
outweighed employees' privacy interests, the drug and alcohol testing 
mandated by Federal Railroad Administration regulations was rea-
sonable despite the lack of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that a 
particular employee might be impaired.46 The Court reasoned that 
the governmental interests in preventing railroad accidents "justifie[d] 
prohibiting covered employees from using alcohol or drugs on duty. "47 
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,48 the Court 
upheld mandatory urinalysis testing of Custom Service employees 
who sought promotion into jobs that involved either the interdiction 
of illegal drugs or the carrying of firearms.49 The Von Raab Court 
held that, although the Custom Service's drug testing program was 
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
a warrant was not necessary because testing employees applying for 
promotions to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or 
requiring them to carry firearms was reasonable under the Fourth 
44. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Although Justice Stevens concurred with the opinion, he 
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the drug testing program served to 
deter drug and alcohol abuse. [d. at 634-35 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented: 
The majority's concern with the railroad safety problems caused by 
drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cavalier disregard for the text 
of the Constitution is not. There is no drug exception to the Consti-
tution, any more than there is a communism exception or an exception 
for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest. 
[d. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 455 (1971). 
45. [d. at 632-33. "These accidents involved a fatality, release of hazardous 
material, or damage to railroad property above a specified amount." Michael 
A. Mass, Public Sector Drug Testing: A Balancing Approach and the Search 
For a New Equilibrium, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 231, 238 n.45 (1990) (citing 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(l)-(3) (1987»). 
"Government officials said that from 1972 through 1983, railroad accidents 
linked to drug or alcohol abuse killed 42 persons, injured 61 and caused $19 
million in property damage." Stephen Kurkjian, Justices OK Drug Tests in 
Some Jobs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1989, at 1. 
In January 1987 a Conrail freight train collided with an Amtrak train near 
Baltimore, killing 16 persons and injuring 158 persons. [d. According to tests 
conducted, the Conrail engineer and brakeman had smoked marijuana just 
prior to the accident. [d. 
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. 
47. [d. at 621. 
48. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
49. [d. at 677. 
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Amendment. so The Court reasoned that safeguarding the borders of 
the United States as well as the safety of the public outweighed the 
Custom Service employees' privacy expectations with respect to the 
urine testing program.SI 
In Von Raab, the Court stated that "requiring employees ... 
to produce urine samples for chemical testing implicate[s] the Fourth 
Amendment, as those tests invade reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy!'S2 In Skinner, however, the Court stated that "where the 
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and where an 
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be 
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a 
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. "S3 
Thus, as a result of these two Supreme Court cases, the following 
standard has emerged: A government employee may be tested when 
there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee is impaired by, or 
under the influence of, drugs while at work or when a compelling 
government interest served by the regulations outweighs the employ-
ee's privacy concerns. 
II. CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. UNITED FOOD & 
COMMERCIAL WORKERS, LOCAL 400 
In 1986, the City of Annapolis proposed a drug testing plan as 
part of the regularly scheduled physical examinations required for 
50. rd. 
51. [d. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented: "I think it obvious that 
this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties 
cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for 
so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an 
otherwise unreasonable search." [d. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Marshall, again joined by Justice Brennan, dissented for the same reasons as 
in Skinner. [d. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
52. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-18). In Skinner, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than 
the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they 
talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without 
public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally 
prohibited by law as well as social custom. . . . [T]he Federal Courts 
of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these 
intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (citation omitted). 
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400, 
317 Md. 544, 551,565 A.2d 672, 675 (1989), the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
noted that "[a] 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." [d. at 551 n.2, 565 A.2d at 675 
n.2 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984». 
53. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
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city uniformed police and fire fightersY The unions objected to parts 
of the plan, and when the parties could not reach an agreement, the 
City filed an unfair labor practices complaint with the State Mediation 
and Conciliation Service (hereinafter "Service").55 The Service found 
that the City's drug testing program was constitutional and permitted 
it to be imposed. 56 The unions appealed to the Circuit Court for 
Anne Arundel County, which held that the plan was unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment because it was not based on individ-
ualized suspicion of drug use among the employeesY The City 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari 
prior to consideration by the court of special appeals. 58 On certiorari, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial court.59 
In United Food, the court of appeals held that a program of 
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of uniformed police and fire 
fighters did not violate the Fourth Amendment when conducted 
during an employee's regularly scheduled physical examination.60 The 
court noted that employees had a diminished expectation of privacy 
because they had previously consented to urinalyses during routine 
physical examinations.61 With the Skinner and Von Raab cases as 
their guide, the court of appeals reasoned that the City's interest in 
the safety of police and fire fighters, co-workers, and the public was 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the privacy interests of police 
and fire personnel. 62 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the constitutionality 
of the City of Annapolis' drug testing program. Although some 
degree of individualized suspicion is normally required for searches 
in the absence of the warrant and probable cause requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, there are exceptions, as illustrated in the 
54. United Food, 317 Md. at 546, 565 A.2d at 672-73. 
55. [d. at 546, 565 A.2d at 673. See generally MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMF. § 
4-103 (1991) (The Mediation Service is a unit functioning within the State 
Division of Labor and Industry.). 
56. United Food, 317 Md. at 547-48, 565 A.2d at 673-74. 
57. [d. at 548-49, 565 A.2d at 674. 
58. [d. at 550, 565 A.2d at 675. 
59. [d. at 566-67, 565 A.2d at 683. 
60. [d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. The court of appeals held that the City's drug 
testing program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court 
reasoned that while the Fourth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights are independent of each other, the two constitutional provisions should 
be read in pari materia. [d. at 566 n.4, 565 A.2d at 683 n.4 (citing Widgeon 
v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 532, 479 92A.2d 921, 927 (1984); 
Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319-20,430 A.2d 49, 54 (1981); Attorney Gen. 
v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714, 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981». 
61. United Food, 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. 
62. [d. at 561-63, 565 A.2d at 680-81. 
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Supreme Court cases of Von Raab and Skinner. 63 The court of 
appeals balanced the governmental interests in conducting the search 
against the employee's expectation of privacy in deciding whether 
the search was reasonable. 64 
A. Privacy Interests 
In evaluating the privacy interests of the employees, the court 
of appeals focused· on the actual drug analysis of the uriQe sample, 
not on the mandatory taking of the sample.6s The reason for this 
focus was that the employees "had participated for several years, 
without objection, in providing urine specimens for analysis as part 
of their required periodic physical examinations."66 Although the 
court acknowledged that the actual assaying of samples for drug use 
constituted a search, the court found that "the intrusion on [the 
employee's] reasonable expectations of privacy was not only 'mini-
mal' under Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible for several rea-
sons."67 
First, the court of appeals observed that the employees received 
three distinct notices of testing: (1) the physical would be during 
their "birthday" month; (2) within thirty days, they knew the week 
of the examination; and (3) within forty-eight hours, they knew the 
63. [d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (citations omitted). Compare National Treasury 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing 
for Custom Service employees applying for promotion to positions involving 
interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms) and Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding suspi-
cionless drug testing for railroad employees involved in certain train accidents 
or violations of safety standards) with City of Annapolis v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989) (upholding 
suspicionless drug testing for police and fire fighter personnel when conducted 
during the employee's annual physical examination). 
64. United Food, 317 Md. at 553-63, 565 A.2d at 676-81. Whether a search is 
reasonable depends upon a balancing test set forth by Justice O'Connor in 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), as follows: 
A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a 
particular class of searches requires "[balancing) the nature and quality 
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify 
the intrusion." In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, 
we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations 
of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and 
the efficient operation of the workplace. 
[d. at 719-20 (quoting United States v.Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983» 
(citations omitted). 
65. See United Food, 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. 
66. [d. For several years, police and fire fighters participated in periodic physical 
examinations where a urine specimen was used to analyze for physiological 
explications other than drug use. [d. 
67. [d. 
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time of the examination.68 The court compared the case before it 
with Von Raab and found that, in the latter case, the employees 
also received advance notice of the test date.69 The court explained 
that receiving three notices prior t~ testing helped minimize the 
intrusion on the employees' privacy interests and allayed any anxieties 
about drug testing. 70 
Second, the court found that disclosure of "private facts," 
including signs of physical infirmities or latent diseases, was already 
part of the employees' periodic physical examination.71 The court 
stated that physicians skilled in urinalysis would examine the urine 
sample for such latent diseases or infirmities.72 The court emphasized 
that the United Food case involved a lesser degree of intrusion than 
Skinner, because the tests in Skinner were not part of a regularly 
scheduled physical examination. Furthermore, Skinner required only 
"that the urine tests . . . not be used to inquire into private facts 
unrelated to alcohol or drug use. "73 Therefore, the possible disclosure 
of private facts in United Food was deemed not to be a significant 
invasion of privacy. 
Third, the court of appeals noted that the employees were 
required to complete a medication form to insure that the test results 
were accurate. 74 Similarly, in Skinner, railroad employees were re-
quired to fill out a form listing any medication taken within thirty 
days before the test.7S The court in United Food explained that, like 
Skinner, the purpose of the medication form was "to discover 
whether a positive test result may be explained by the employee's 
lawful use of drugs. "76 The court of appeals addressed the concern 
that the completion of a medication form by the employee permitted 
the government to learn private facts about an individual that the 
individual did not want disclosed, such as epilepsy, pregnancy or 
diabetes." The court, however, found that there was no indication 
that the government would disclose such information or use it for 
other purposes. 78 In addition, the court was confident that, even 
68. Id. at 554, 565 A.2d at 676-77. 
69. Id. at 553-54, 565 A.2d at 676-77. 
70.Id. 
71. Id. at 554, 565 A.2d at 677. 
72.Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677. 
75. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7 (1989). 
The Court did not find it a significant invasion of privacy that employees 
giving blood or urine samples must disclose all medications taken within 30 
days. Id. 
76. United Food, 317 Md. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 
n.7. 
77. United Food, 317 Md. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
626 n.7). 
78.Id. 
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without drug testing, such disclosure of facts would be the subject 
of an inquiry during the course of the employee's regularly scheduled 
physical examination.79 The purpose of the annual physical exami-
nation was to uncover all medical facts having a bearing on the 
employee's health and fitness in performing his duties. Con.sequently, 
urinalysis was not likely to reveal any personal information, other 
than the use of drugs, that had not already been uncovered in the 
annual physical examination. 
Finally, the regular physical examinations were used to inquire 
into the employees' fitness and probity.so The court observed that 
the program's objective was to provide secure and proficient working 
conditions for its employees and to protect the public by regulating 
and treating the illegal use of drugs.81 In Von Raab, the Supreme 
Court held that employees involved in drug interdiction, or those 
who carry a firearm, should expect their employer to inquire into 
their physical fitness and integrity: "Because successful performance 
of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity. 
these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the [Custom] 
Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness. "82 
Similarly, the United Food court recognized the City of Anna-
polis' police and fire personnel were also "required to meet a 
minimum level of fitness to sustain the demands of physical and 
mental stress that may arise spontaneously and in a manner not 
experienced by other public employees."83 The court, however, failed 
to recognize that the City's program goes beyond the guidelines of 
Skinner. In Skinner, suspicionless drug testing was allowed because 
the railroad industry is a highly regulated industry notorious for its 
alcohol and drug abuse problem.84 Based upon such clear evidence 
of a serious crisis in public safety, the Supreme Court upheld 
suspicionless testing, but only after a serious train accident occurred. 
Although there was no evidence of a significant drug or alcohol 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 555-56, 565 A.2d at 677-78. 
81. [d. at 556, 565 A.2d at 677. 
82. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989). 
83. United Food, 317 Md. at 556, 565 A.2d at 677-78; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMP. § 9-503 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
84. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989). In 
Skinner, the FRA testing regulations resulted from a study which determined 
that "an estimated one out of every eight railroad workers drank at least once 
while on duty during the study year." [d. at 607 n.1 (citations omitted). In 
addition, "5070 of workers reported to work 'very drunk' or 'got very drunk' 
on duty at least once in the study year," and "13% of workers reported to 
work at least 'a little drunk' one or more times during that period." [d. The 
study also found that 23070 of the operating personnel were "problem drinkers," 
but that only 4% of these employees "were receiving help through an employee 
assistance program .... " [d. 
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abuse problem in the City's police and fire departments, the United 
Food court concluded that the purpose for the City's drug testing 
was "reasonably and objectively related to the accepted purpose of 
medically investigating the employee's fitness for duty. "85 
To strengthen their decision, the United Food court equated the 
case before it with Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria County 
Transit Authority,86 and distinguished Lovvorn v. City oj Chattan-
oogaY Amalgamated Transit Union involved a requested preliminary 
injunction against mandatory drug and alcohol testing of municipal 
bus drivers and mechanics during regularly scheduled physical ex-
aminations.88 The court in Amalgamated Transit Union held that the 
intrusion on the employees' privacy rights was minimal because the 
drug testing of employees had been a routine part of their annual 
physical examination.89 Moreover, the Amalgamated Transit Union 
court believed it was important for the transit authority to take 
preventive measures to insure the safety of its employees and the 
general public.90 
In both Amalgamated Transit Union and United Food, there 
was little or no evidence that a drug or alcohol problem existed in 
the work force. 91 Moreover, both cases involved tests performed only 
during regularly scheduled physical examinations that already in-
cluded the taking of urine or blood samples. 92 Finally, Amalgamated 
Transit Union and United Food involved unobserved specimen taking, 
a confirmatory test in the event that the initial test results were 
positive, and procedures that protected the confidentiality of the 
employees.93 
Conversely, in Lovvorn, employees were not only subjected to 
a drug test, but also "pat downs" at the discretion of the city fire 
and police commissioners.94 Unlike the program at issue in United 
Food, some fire fighters were even required to provide urine samples 
under the "direct observation" of their superiors.9s In Lovvorn, there 
85. United Food, 317 Md. at 556, 565 A.2d at 678. 
86. 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
87. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), a/I'd. 846 "F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988). 
vacated en banc sub nom., Penny v. Kennedy. 915 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1990). 
88. 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
89. [d. at 904. 
90. See id. at 908. 
91. See id. at 904-05; United Food. 317 Md. at 564-65. 565 A.2d at 682. 
92. See Amalgamated Transit Union. 691 F. Supp. at 904; United Food. 317 Md. 
at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. 
93. Amalgamated Transit Union. 691 F. Supp. at 900-01; United Food, 317 Md. 
at 554, 565 A.2d at 677. 
94. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539. 1540 (6th Cir. 1988). 
95. [d. 
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was no written directive or policy statement delineating the methods 
for testing, managing, or analyzing the urine samples.96 Therefore, 
the court of appeals recognized that the "unstructured and discre-
tionary" nature of the drug testing program in Lovvorn was signif-
icantly more intrusive than the drug screening program in United 
Food. 97 
B. Governmental Interests 
The United Food court identified two compelling governmental 
interests advanced by the drug tests: (1) ensuring that front-line 
interdiction employees are physically competent, and (2) ensuring 
that they have impeccable character and judgment.98 To justify its 
reasoning, the court noted with approval the statement in Von Raab 
that "'the public should not bear the risk that employees who may 
suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to 
positions where they may need. to employ deadly force." '99 The 
United Food court concluded that police officers encounter similar 
risks, in that they also are involved in front-line drug interdiction 
and are permitted to carry firearms whether on-duty or off-duty.100 
Furthermore, police may be placed in a life threatening situation in 
which they must exercise split second judgment in the use of their 
firearms. 101 
With respect to the City's fire fighters, the court observed that 
although fire fighters do not interdict drugs, carry firearms, or handle 
state secrets, fire fighters are "charged with duties to respond quickly 
and effectively at a moment's notice," and their actions have serious 
implications with regard to the life and property of others. 102 Thus, 
the court of appeals in United Food held that the City's interest in 
the safety of personnel, co-workers, and the public outweighed the 
privacy interests of the police and fire fighters. 103 
C. Suspicion less Drug Testing 
The Union's argument that a search warrant is required before 
drug testing is permitted also did not sway the court. Noting that 
96. [d. at 1541. 
97. United Food, 317 Md. at 558-59, 565 A.2d at 679. 
98. [d. at 561-62, 565 A.2d at 680 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1988». 
99. [d. at 562, 565 A.2d at 680-81 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671). The Von 
Raab Court likened such risks to those identified in Skinner, where a brief 
lapse of concentration by employees of the railroad "can have disastrous 
consequences." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989». 
100. United Food, 317 Md. at 562, 565 A.2d at 681. 
101. [d. 
102. See id. at 562, 565 A.2d at 680. 
103. [d. at 562, 565 A.2d at 681. 
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"there is not a great privacy expectation in the drug analysis of an 
employee's urine produced in this regular examination procedure," 
the court concluded that "[a] warrant requirement would add little 
protection to that privacy." 104 While acknowledging that the primary 
purpose of a warrant is to protect privacy interests by assuring 
citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are neither 
random nor arbitrary, the court further stated that the City's program 
was structured to deter illegal drug use, which would be hampered 
by a warrant requirement. lOS Quoting from Von Raab, the court 
asserted that where drug testing is not premised on "a discretionary 
determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions 
are present, there are simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate 
to evaluate."'I06 Therefore, the court was logically correct in con-
cluding that (1) a reasonable suspicion requirement was unwarranted, 
given the government's superior interest in detecting illegal drug use; 
and (2) the warrant justifications were not jeopardized because the 
City's program required suspicionless drug testing in the context of 
an employee's nondiscretionary physical examination.107 
D. Random Drug Testing 
Although random drug testing was not an issue in United Food, 
the court indicated in dictum that a random physical examination 
would require the court to apply a more rigid review.108 Moreover, 
the court of appeals noted that jurisdictions are split as to the 
constitutionality of suspicion less random drug testing in the public 
sector .109 For example, some jurisdictions have upheld random drug 
testing,IIO while others have required some degree of suspicion. III The 
104. [d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681. 
105. [d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681-82. 
106. [d. at 564, 565 A.2d 681-82. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 561, 565 A.2d at 680. 
109. [d. at 559-61, 565 A.2d at 679-80. 
110. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503 
(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding random drug testing by the Navy of civilian 
employees having security clearances and access to classified information); 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (upholding "random, biennial, preemployment and post accident 
testing of urine samples of truck drivers without [a] warrant or without 
individualized suspicion"); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 
885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding suspicionless random drug testing of 
federal transportation workers constitutional), cerl. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990); 
Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding random drug 
testing for civilian employees at a chemical weapons plant); Guiney v. Roache, 
873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.) (holding suspicionless random drug testing of city 
police constitutional), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 963 (1989); Policemen's Benevolent 
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legality of purely random drug testing of government workers has 
not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court. To date, 
the Court has consistently declined to review cases such as Harmon 
v. Thornhurghl12 and Hartness v. Bush,1I3 both of which address this 
issue. 
III. DRUG TESTING OF MARYLAND STATE EMPLOYEES 
On April 7, 1989, Governor William Donald Schaefer outlined 
the State's commitment to a drug-free workplace in an executive 
order entitled "State of Maryland Substance Abuse Policy," 114 which 
made it a condition of employment that all state employees refrain 
from using illegal drugs. liS Although subsequently rescinded by a 
Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding 
suspicion less random urinalysis of police officers constitutional), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1004 (1989). 
Ill. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (department of agriculture employees who do not hold safety or security-
sensitive jobs); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (prison 
employees having daily contact with prisoners); Beattie v. City of St. Petersburg 
Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (fire fighters); Wrightsell v. City 
of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. 1II. 1988) (police officers not tested as 
part of routine, reasonably-required medical examination); Smith v. White, 666 
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (nuclear plant employees), a/I'd, 857 F.2d 
1475 (6th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 
F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (department of defense civilian police officers 
holding "critical" jobs); McKenzie v. Jackson, 556 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1990) 
(probationary correction officers). 
112. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Bell v. Thornburgh, 
493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (holding random drug testing by urinalysis of personnel 
holding "top secret" security clearances was permissible). 
113. 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2890 (1991) (holding 
random drug testing by urinalysis of employees who held "secret" security 
clearances was permissible). 
114. 16:8 Md. Reg. 900 (1989) (codified at Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1989.05 
(rescinded by Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16»; see COMAR 06.01.09 
(delineating current drug testing regulations). The 1989 Executive Order amended 
the January 9, 1989 drug testing regulations under COMAR 06.01.01 which 
previously allowed the Secretary of Personnel to test employees for drug abuse 
only upon "reasonable suspicion." See COMAR 06.01.09.04(A) (Supp. 10, 
1988). As of November 20, 1990, the Secretary of Personnel is authorized to 
test state employees in "sensitive positions" or in "sensitive classifications" 
on a random basis. See COMAR 06.01.09.04(B). As indicated, the Governor's 
original order, Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1989.05, was rescinded by a 
subsequent order in 1991, Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16. 
115. At the time of its implementation, the Substance Abuse Policy was expected 
to affect approximately 13,000 state workers. Maryland: Drug Testing, Individ-
ual Emp. Rights Newsletter (BNA) (Nov. 20, 1990) in WL 5 IER 21d 4, at 
*1. 
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more comprehensive order, 116 both the original order and its successor 
emphasize the commitment "to making good faith efforts to insure 
a safe, secure, and drug-free workplace for its employees consistent 
with the Drug-Free Workplace Act as enacted by Congress."117 Thus, 
the Governor's orders focus not upon the use of drug testing or 
screening as a specific means of identifying drug users, but upon the 
broader goal of removing from the workplace those employees whose 
drug or alcohol use jeopardizes the safety or security of themselves 
or others. In this regard, both the original order and its successor 
explicitly recognize the distinct status of employees in "sensitive" 
classifications,1I8 a theme also echoed by the COMAR regulations 
that implement the testing of state employees for illegal drug use. 1I9 
Maryland's drug testing statute, section 17-214.1 of the Health-
General Code, specifically grants private employers the right to test 
for drug or alcohol use by employees or applicants. 12o Currently, 
there is no Maryland statute directly requiring state agencies to 
implement drug testing programs for their employees. 121 Pursuant to 
Article 64A of the Annotated Code of Maryland, however, the 
. Secretary of Personnel for the State of Maryland has the authority 
to adopt by regulation a drug testing program. 122 After consulting 
with the Attorney General of Maryland,123 regulations establishing a 
procedure for testing for illegal drug use by state employees and 
applicants for state employment were proposed by the Secretary in 
June 1988124 and adopted in December of that year.12S As originally 
adopted, the regulations required the testing of all applicants l26 and 
116. See Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.06 (codifying 18:8 Md. Reg. 848 (1991». 
117. [d. 01.01.1991.06(B)(I); accord Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.l989.05(C). 
118. Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16(A)(7); Exec. Order (CO MAR) 
01.01.1989.05(A)(6). 
119. See COMAR 06.01.09.01(B)(8). 
120. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1 (1990 & Supp. 1992). 
121. See 75 Op. Au'y Gen. Md. 91 (1990). On January 17, 1990 Delegate Ryan 
introduced H.D. 370, which would have authorized the Secretary of Personnel 
to establish and implement a drug testing program for all State applicants and 
employees in "sensitive positions" or upon individualized suspicion. H.D. 
370, Reg. Sess. (1990). However, on April 9, 1990 the bill was withdrawn 
from the House Appropriations Committee. Telephone Interview with Esther 
Bishop, Department of Legislative Reference, General Assembly of Maryland, 
Library and Information Services Division (Dec. 28, 1990). 
122. 75 Op. Au'y Gen. Md. 91, 98 (1990); see COMAR 06.01.09 (delineating 
current drug testing regulations). 
123. See 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58 (1986). 
124. See 15:13 Md. Reg. 1559 (1988) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 
06.01.09). 
125. See 15:27 Md. Reg. 3126 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09). 
126. As defined in COMAR, "applicant" "means a person who is seeking an 
employer-employee relationship in a position in a sensitive classification or in 
a sensitive position." COMAR 06.01.09.01(B)(2). 
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applicant-employee-s I27 for positions in "sensitive classifications"128 
who had "not been eliminated from consideration at an earlier stage 
of the recruitment process." 129 Incumbent employees performing in 
sensitive classifications, however, were subject to drug testing only 
"if the condition of reasonable suspicion exist[ed]." 130 
In March 1990, following the issuance of the Skinner and Von 
Raab opinions by the Supreme Court, the Secretary of Personnel· 
proposed that the scope of the State's employee drug testing program 
be expanded. 13I The most significant changes were (1) the broadening 
of circumstances under which incumbent "sensitive" employees could 
be required to submit to drug testing; and (2) the implementation of 
random testing of employees. The new regulations, adopted in August 
1990,132 permitted an "appointing authority" 133 to require that an 
employee be tested if the following conditions were present: 
(1) The appointing authority had reasonable suspicion that 
a test would produce evidence of illegal drug use; or 
127. As defined in COMAR, "applicant-employee" "means an employee of the 
State who is an applicant for a position that is: (a) In a sensitive classification 
or is a sensitive position; and (b) Different from or in addition to the position 
currently held by the applicant-employee." COMAR 06.01.09.01(8)(3). 
128. Under the regulations, a "sensitive classification" means 
a classification in the classified service in which the Secretary [of 
Personnel] has determined that all of the following conditions exist: 
(a) A substantially significant degree of responsibility for the 
safety of others; 
(b) A potential that impaired performance of the employee could 
result in death of or injury to the employee or others; and 
(c) Lack of close monitoring of the employee's behavior, which 
reduces the possibility of intervention or assistance by another when 
necessary. 
15:13 Md. Reg. 1559, 1560 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR 
06.01.09.01 (8)(8». 
129. Id. (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.03(8». 
130. Id. at 1561 (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(A»; 15:27 Md. Reg. 
3126, 3127 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(A». At the 
time the regulations were originally adopted, the Attorney General believed 
that "[m]andatory testing of most categories of State employees would violate 
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.'" 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58, 59 (1986). 
131. See 17:5 Md. Reg. 649 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 
06.01.09). The COMAR drug testing provisions were again ainended in 1991 
in order to offer more protection to employees who tested positive; to require 
the use of only those laboratories whose services have been contracted by the 
Department of Personnel; and to clarify the confidentiality protections of test 
results. 18:9 Md. Reg. 1007 (1991); 18:5 Md. Reg. 598 (1991); see 17:26 Md. 
Reg. 2972 (1990). 
132. See 17:15 Md. Reg. 1854 (1990). 
133. An "appointing authority" is defined as "a person who has the power to 
make appointments and to terminate employment." COMAR 06.01.09.01(8)(4). 
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(2) The employee was directly involved in an incident that 
resulted in injury to person(s) or property; or 
(3) The employee notified his or her appointing authority 
that the employee was voluntarily participating in a drug 
abuse rehabilitation program. 134 
In addition, the 1990 regulations require that "[e]ach appointing 
authority, with the approval of the Secretary [of Personnel], shall 
assure that employees in positions in sensitive classifications or in 
sensitive positions within the appointing authority are subject to 
random testing for illegal use of drugs."13s 
The drug testing program examined by the United Food court 
was clearly of more limited scope and applicability than the program 
promulgated by the Secretary of Personnel for state employees. In 
particular, the regulations require random drug testing of state em-
ployees in "sensitive" positions and classifications.t36 Although United 
Food dealt with employees in sensitive positions, the court of appeals 
stated in dictum that it had "no occasion to consider whether random 
drug testing, not based on reasonable suspicion, unconstitutionally 
invades reasonable expectations of privacy." 137 The court did, how-
ever, suggest that there might be a constitutionally significant differ-
ence between random 138 and mandatory drug testing; 139 "a purely 
. random physical examination program for the purpose of drug testing 
would likely necessitate more stringent review." 140 
The dictum in United Food,' however, has not disabused the 
Attorney General of Maryland of the view that random drug testing 
of state employees in "sensitive" jobs is constitutional. 141 In an 
opinion dated March 2, 1990, Maryland's Attorney General, J. 
Joseph Curran, Jr., stated that the principles of Skinner and Von 
134. 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 
06.01.09.04(A». 
135. 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 
06.01.09.04(B)(I». The new § .04(B) also outlined the nature of the random 
testing. See id. (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(B)(2)-
(3». 
136. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
137. City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 
Md. 544, 561, 565 A.2d 672, 680 (1989). 
138. See 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990). "Random testing requires that statistically 
significant samples of employees in sensitive classifications or in sensitive 
positions be tested on a periodic basis." COMAR 06.01.09.04(B)(2). 
139. Mandatory testing requires employees to submit to an urinalysis test for 
laboratory study. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58 (1986). 
140. United Food, 317 Md. at 561, 565 A.2d at 680. 
141. See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 94 (1990). 
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Raab apply equally to random drug testing. 142 Indeed, as pointed out 
by the Attorney General, "the only decision of the Fourth Circuit 
on this issue stated flatly that 'the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of random drug tests in Skinner ... and .. , Von 
Raab .... "'143 The Attorney General's position is also reinforced 
by the holding of American Federation of Government Employees 
v. Skinner,.44 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia rejected the union's argument that random 
testing is more intrusive than the mandatory drug testing condoned 
by the Supreme Court: 
We find [the] analysis [in Skinner] fully applicable in the 
present case. While it is true that the regulations sustained 
in Skinner required testing only after a triggering event and 
in a medical environment, we do not find that either of 
these facts compels a "fundamentally different analysis from 
that pursued by the Supreme Court." . ; . While it is true 
that random testing may increase employee anxiety and the 
invasion of subjective expectations of privacy, it also limits 
discretion in the selection process and presumably enhances 
drug-use deterrence. 145 
Thus, Maryland has determined from the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Skinner and Von Raab that the distinction between random 
and mandatory testing is not fundamental, but merely an additional 
factor to be evaluated and weighed. Maryland seems to have decided 
that a significant intrusion upon privacy is outweighed by a presumed 
nexus between drug use and the disclosure of sensitive material. 
IV. TESTING PROCEDURES 
Drug testing in Maryland takes the form of analysis of urine 
specimens subject to a screening test called an immunoassay.l46 Pos-
itive test results from the immunoassay are then confirmed by a Gas 
142. [d. at 93. The Attorney General's Office reiterated the position that they 
"discern no constitutionally significant difference between categorical testing 
and random testing. The determinative point is that testing without individu-
alized suspicion is constitutionally permissible under some circumstances. That 
the methodology of a testing program is random rather than categorical makes 
no difference, in our view." [d. 
143. [d. at 94 (quoting Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 114 (4th CiT. 1989». 
144. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990). 
145. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 95 (1990) (quoting American Fed'n of Gov't Employees 
V. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 891) (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 
(1990). 
146. COMAR 06.01.09.07(A). 
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Chromatography - Mass Spectroscopy (GC-MS) test. 147 Employers 
are required to confirm an initial positive result, as well as provide 
the employee with a copy of the following: 
(i) the laboratory test indicating the test results; 
(ii) the employer's written policy; 
(iii) written notice of the employer's intent to take discipli-
nary action; and 
(iv) the provisions of the law regarding the employee's right 
to secure independent verification. l48 
Such information must be delivered in person or by certified 
mail to the employee within thirty days of the date of the test. 149 In 
addition, an employer who requires any person to be tested for illegal 
drug use because of job related reasons shall do the following: 
(1) Have the specimen tested by a laboratory that 
(i) holds a permit under this subtitle; or 
(ii) is located outside of the State and is certified or 
otherwise approved under [the Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene regulations]; and 
(2) At the time of testing, at the person's request, inform 
the person of the mime and address of the laboratory that 
will test the specimen. ISO 
Except for job-related alcohol or controlled dangerous substance 
testing, no laboratory, physician, or any other person, may report 
positive test results to an employer if the substance detected is a 
legal nonprescription drug or a prescription drug that an employee 
can show was legitimately prescribed. lSI 
These procedures do not apply to: 
147. COMAR 06.01.09.07(8). As noted by the Attorney General, 
Maryland law does not require that the screening [of positive test 
results) be done by a "medical review officer" which is a term in the 
guidelines of the federal drug testing program referring to a physician 
specially trained in substance abuse disorders who evaluates positive 
test results in light of an employee's medical background. 
75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 17 (1990); see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-
214.1 (1990 & Supp. 1992). 
148. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1(c)(I)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1992). 
149. [d. § 17-214.1(c)(2)(i)-(ii). 
150. [d. § 17-214.1(b)(I)-(2). A laboratory may analyze a specimen only upon order 
of a physician except drug tests conducted for job-related reasons may be 
ordered directly by an employer with a laboratory. [d. § 17-214.1; see 75 Op. 
Att'y Gen. Md. 19, 21 (1990). 
151. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1(h) (1990 & Supp. 1992). Nondisclo-
sure of information under this section does not apply to a person complying 
with the Federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. [d. § 17-214.1(h)(2) (Supp. 1992). 
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(1) Alcohol or controlled dangerous substance testing of a 
person under arrest or held by a law enforcement or cor-
rectional agency; 
(2) Alcohol testing procedures conducted by a law enforce-
ment or correctional agency on breath testing equipment 
certified by the State Toxicologist; or 
(3) Controlled dangerous substance testing by a laboratory 
facility of a law enforcement or correctional agency that 
maintains laboratory testing standards comparable to the 
standards in this section. 152 
All of these procedures should be viewed in light of the expressed 
poiicy of balancing the employee's right to privacy against the 
government's objective of a safe and productive work environment. 
V. IMPACT ON MARYLAND LAW 
The initial consequence of the court of appeals decision in United 
Food has been the establishment of a prototype for Maryland police 
and fire departments that want to implement drug testing. Another 
consequence will be the reevaluation of existing government drug 
testing programs and the introduction of new programs for other 
fields of work affecting the safety of the pUblic. 
Also, with the recent implementation of random drug testing by 
Maryland's State Department of Personnel for applicants and em-
ployees in sensitive and classified positions, the court of appeals will 
most likely be asked to rule on random drug testing in the near 
future. The full import of the United Food decision will not be 
known, however, until there is further litigation in this area. IS3 Of 
course, widespread drug testing by itself will not cure the drug 
epidemic. Drug testing, combined with strict criminal law enforce-
ment, public relations campaigns, and rehabilitation measures, should 
be implemented to reach a large percentage of government employees 
in the work force. 154 
152. Id. § 17.214.1(f)(1)-(3) (1990 & Supp. 1992). 
153. As of the expected publication date of this Article, only one case challenging 
the dismissal of a state employee resulting from drug testing had reached the 
state's appellate courts. In Singletary v. Maryland State Department of Public 
Safety & Correctional Services, 87 Md. App. 405, 589 A.2d 1311 (1991), 
however, the dismissed employee did not raise a constitutional challenge. 
Instead, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded the employee's 
dismissal was invalid because the employee's appointing authority failed to 
adequately advise him of the consequences of refusing to be tested. Id. at 418, 
589 A.2d at 1318. . 
154. B. Fein & W.B. Reyno·lds, Drug Tests: No Harm to the Innocent, MANHATTAN 
LAW., 1989, at 13. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In its decision in United Food, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
decided against imposing stricter limitations on drug testing than 
those set out by the Supreme Court in its decisions of Skinner and 
Von Raab. The court of appeals created a special exception to the 
reasonable suspicion requirement for drug testing of police and fire 
fighters when conducted during the employee's regularly scheduled 
physical examination. Citing strong public policy and the govern-
ment's interest in protecting employees and the public, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has determined that the right to privacy is 
reduced when it seriously interferes with the safe management of 
job-related duties. Thus, it appears that Maryland courts will have 
little trouble upholding the constitutionality of most government drug 
testing programs. 
